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Abstract
Barcodes and barcode scanners transformed the grocery industry in the 1970s.
I use store-level data from the 1972, 1977, and 1982 Census of Retail Trade,
matched to data on store scanner installations, to estimate scanners' eect on
labor productivity. I nd that early scanners increased a store's labor productiv-
ity, on average, by approximately 4.5 percent in the rst few years. The eect
was larger in stores carrying more packaged products, consistent with the pres-
ence of network externalities. Short-run gains were small relative to xed costs,
suggesting that the impediment to widespread adoption of the new technology
was protability, not coordination problems.
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This paper takes a rst step towards achieving a better understanding of the eect of tech-
nology on the retail sector by investigating the impact of barcode scanners, which were rst
installed in the mid-1970s, on productivity in supermarkets. Scanners represent a discrete,
easy-to-measure form of technological innovation, providing a clean laboratory to study their
impact on productivity. After decades in the \idea" (pre-commercial) phase, once scanners
commercialized, they caught on quickly: about a third of U.S. supermarkets adopted scan-
ners within ten years of the rst commercial installation.
Productivity in the retail sector is notoriously hard to measure and not well understood.
The link between chains and productivity is made most convincingly by Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Krizan (2006), who nd that virtually all productivity growth in retailing in the 1990s
was due to store entry (particularly through chain expansion) and exit (particularly of non-
chain stores). This nding is consistent with a technology gap between chains and \Mom
and Pop" retailers, although data limitations prevent the authors from determining whether
this productivity gap is due to technology, management, economies of scale, or some other
factor. Doms, Jarmin, and Klimek (2004) come the closest to linking retail productivity
and technology adoption by showing that retail rms reporting high levels of information-
technology (IT) investment in 1992 also experienced high labor productivity growth between
1992 and 1997. In this paper, I go even further by locating a \smoking gun" (more accurately,
a smoking scanner) in IT investment and linking it directly to store-level productivity growth.
Because scanners diused over time, I use the panel dimension of the data to rule out some
omitted-variable and endogeneity concerns.
I trace the impact of scanners on store-level productivity by matching data from the
Food Marketing Institute on store scanner installations in the 1970s and early 1980s to
Census Bureau records at the establishment (store) level. I use data from the Census of
Retail Trade for 1972, 1977, and 1982 in a dierence-in-dierence specication and nd that
productivity increased by an average of 4.5% in stores that installed barcode scanners before1982. This average eect masks variation both over time and across stores: gains in the year
of installation were smaller, and varied even in later years with the products sold by each
store. To address endogeneity bias, I use only stores that installed scanners by the end of
1984. Even in this sample, my identication depends on the standard dierence-in-dierence
assumption that the timing of treatment (in this case, scanner adoption) is independent of
the error term. While this assumption is not directly testable, specication tests show no
evidence of sample-selection or omitted-variable bias.
Investigating the skill bias of scanner adoption, I nd some suggestive evidence that
scanners were an unskilled-biased technology, at least in the long run. In the short run
scanners appear to have reduced labor costs by reducing the demand for both skilled and
unskilled labor, although not necessarily in the same proportions.
I use my estimates to perform two back-of-the-envelope calculations. In the rst, I
provide a ballpark estimate of the increase in the productivity boost due to scanners from
having one more barcoded product on a store's shelves. This increase turns out to be the
equivalent of about $28 per year, per store, giving some sense of the magnitude of network
externalities in the implementation of scanning. A second calculation totals up the costs,
pecuniary and non-pecuniary, and benets from scanning, and concludes that the early
scanners probably did not provide a positive return on investment. This nding suggests
that limited short-run protability, not coordination costs, was the salient barrier to early
adoption of this new technology.
The large gap between the short-run private returns and the long-term social return on
the investment in scanners can be explained by the emergence over time of complementary
technologies that would not have been possible in the absence of scanners. In the short run,
the limited number of products bearing Uniform Product Code (UPC) symbols was a binding
constraint on the potential for productivity gains. At the time of the rst scanner installa-
tions, only 2,000 food and beverage manufacturers had signed up to print barcodes on their
products; by the end of 1984, nearly 13,000 manufacturers had signed up, greatly increasing
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tory management, which, in turn, made possible electronic data interchange (EDI) between
retailers and their suppliers, including electronic payments (Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond,
and Weil, 1999).
This paper builds on a small literature on scanner installations. Levin, Levin, and Meisel
(1985, 1987, 1992) and Das, Falaris, and Mulligan (2009) have used dierent subsets of the
scanner installation data to study, respectively, the reasons for variable early diusion rates
across U.S. metropolitan areas, the role of market concentration and rm size in scanner
adoption, dierences in the speed of intra-rm diusion across supermarket chains, and
changes in the diusion process with the emergence of new vintages of the technology. Beck,
Grajek, and Wey (2011) use aggregate data on scanner adoption in ten European countries
to estimate country-specic diusion parameters and relate them to the structure of the
retail market in each country. I depart from this literature on scanner installations in two
important regards. First, my focus is on the eects of scanners rather than on their diusion
pattern. Second, merging the scanner data with store-level information from the Census of
Retail Trade allows me to construct a control group for adopting stores at each point in
time, and compare their outcomes with a counterfactual.
The paper also contributes to the broader discourse on the impact of technology on
productivity (for a 
avor of this literature, see Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003; Jorgenson, Ho,
and Stiroh, 2008; Marrano, Haskel, and Wallis, 2009). Unlike most of that literature, which
has focused on the 1990s, my study uses data from an earlier era of rapid technological
innovation, and from a sector | retailing | that has been largely under-studied. A nal
twist in this case study is the presence of two-sided network externalities. Scanner installation
can only increase a supermarket's productivity if the products on its shelves are equipped
with UPC symbols (barcodes). Although I do not have data on the food-manufacturer side
of the market, my calculations suggest that network externalities were substantial.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the
3grocery sector and on the history of barcode scanners. Section 3 describes the data sources
used in this study. Sections 4{6 attempt to answer the following questions: What was the
impact of scanners on store-level productivity? How was this productivity gain achieved?
And did scanners' benets justify their costs? Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
The barcode, or UPC, originates with Wallace Flint's 1932 Harvard Master's thesis. Nor-
man Joseph Woodland and Bernard Silver applied for a patent on a similar innovation in
1949. Implementation took more than two more decades and an organization, the Ad Hoc
Committee on a Uniform Grocery Product Identication Code, that brought together food
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, with the help of consulting company McKinsey &
Co., to agree on a standard. By this point, Wallace Flint was himself a Vice President of
the National Association of Food Chains, and Norman Joseph Woodland was employed as
an engineer by IBM and was a leader of IBM's eorts to get into the checkout business. The
Ad Hoc Committee included representatives of one independent grocer and one cooperative,
along with executives of the largest supermarket chains: Kroger, A&P, and Super Value
(Haberman, 2001, p. 145).
Scanning became a reality in June 1974 at a Marsh supermarket in Troy, Ohio.1 Over
the next ten years, the publication Scanning Installation Up-Date by the Food Marketing
Institute (FMI) regularly reported the number of grocery stores that installed or upgraded
their scanners. At rst, scanner installation was slow, but it picked up in the early 1980s.
In January 1985 the publication Marketing News reported that 29% of supermarkets in the
U.S. were using the technology (reported in Das, Falaris, and Mulligan, 2009). Figure 1
shows the timeline of scanner installations based on the FMI data; by the end of 1984, more
1Coincidentally, 1974 is the year that Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) cite as a watershed, the year in
which the pace of technological change in the eciency of new equipment increased.
4than 10,000 supermarkets had installed scanners. The shaded regions show the periods on
which the present study focuses.
Scanners improved over time. The main improvements in scanning technology before
the mid-1980s were, rst, an increase in scanners' ability to read small bar codes, and second,
the introduction of a holographic technique that allowed optical scanning of damaged or wet
barcodes (Das, Falaris, and Mulligan, 2009). These innovations, combined with a general
trend of increasing UPC adoption by food manufacturers, resulted in better UPC coverage
across the food sector. Bill Selmeier, who worked for IBM during the 1970s, reports that
when scanners were rst installed, \very few items [...] had the symbol included in their
brand packaging," limiting the scanners' benets (Selmeier, 2008, p. 223). As time went on,
however, packages were increasingly likely to include barcodes. According to one account,
by 1980 more than 90% of grocery products had UPC registrations (Harmon and Adams,
1984, p. 7). Zimmerman (1999) reports that between May 1974 and November 1980, the
number of grocery manufacturers that had adopted UPCs increased almost tenfold, from
869 to 7,570 (p. 45).
The technology was originally intended to speed up customer check-out and reduce labor
costs at the cash register as well as on the store 
oor, for example for price changes. The
main reason early adopters gave for implementing the new technology was their interest in
assessing \the labor-saving potential of the equipment" in a realistic setting (Shaw, 1977,
p. 54). Few initial adopters conducted proper assessments of the technology, either because
they had no baseline against which to measure productivity or because they implemented
other changes in conjunction with scanner installation (Shaw, 1977, p. 51). Instead, they
relied on McKinsey's forecasts and the equipment manufacturers' estimates to justify the
expense.2
Early results of scanner installations were mixed if not disappointing. After interviewing
2Brown (1997, p. 44) notes that McKinsey \was far from a disinterested, neutral observer in the process.
It saw its role as that of a leader and advocate [for scanning], and was not shy about exercising it."
550 retailers that adopted scanners by November 30, 1976, Shaw (1977, p. 233) concludes,
\23 rms ... [reported] improved speed of throughput due to scanning at the checkout, while
12 ... [claimed] unchanged or reduced productivity. The results achieved by the remaining
15 were indeterminate." There are some reports from the late 1970s and early 1980s on the
productivity gain from these scanners, but none are convincingly documented. Harmon and
Adams (1984, p. 204), for example, report that the grocery industry realized productivity
gains of 40% over manual price entry, but cite no source for this gure.
Today, scanners provide previously unimaginable data. Store managers report using
scanner data primarily for promotions and price setting (Bucklin and Gupta, 1999), but
scanners can also provide detailed worker-level productivity information | items scanned
per second | which may be used in promotion or compensation decisions. Mas and Moretti
(2009) use such detailed productivity data to study the eect of peers on checkout speed.
Scanner data also helps track consumer demand through so-called \loyalty" cards, and
scanner-enabled inventory management has improved in-stock rates (Matsa, 2011). Many
authors have speculated that barcode scanners | and the IT revolution in inventory man-
agement that scanning made possible | provided the foundation for the increased product
selection and the growth of stores we have observed in recent decades (see, e.g., Holmes,
2001; Basker, Klimek, and Van, forthcoming).
3 Data
Data on scanner installations come from the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) publication
Scanning Installation Up-Date and provide the month and year of installation by store,
from the rst scanner installation at a Marsh supermarket store in Troy, Ohio, in June
1974, until the end of 1984. The data were compiled by FMI through regular phone calls
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12,000 installations are listed in these les by the end of 1984, approximately a quarter of
which are specied to be \upgrades." I focus my attention on de novo installations. Figure 2
show the locations of scanners in the 48 contiguous states as of December 1977 and December
1982.
For the period 1976{1984, the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) maintained by
the Census Bureau lists, with few exceptions, all business establishments with paid em-
ployees in the United States. (Exceptions include most government-owned or -operated
establishments, establishments operated by religious organizations or schools, and agricul-
tural establishments.) The LBD is described in detail in Jarmin and Miranda (2002), but I
describe the most relevant features here. The LBD records the existence of an establishment
and provides the establishment's industrial classication. Establishments are linked over
time through a unique identication number, and are matched to the owning rm, which
may be a single-establishment rm or a multi-establishment rm. In the retail context, a
multi-establishment rm is usually a chain, although it can also be a rm operating one
retail outlet and one or more non-retail outlets (manufacturing facilities, warehouses, etc.).
Since scanners were initially installed exclusively in grocery stores and supermarkets, I use
only establishments coded with SIC 541: grocery stores, food stores, and supermarkets.
My analysis critically depends on correctly matching scanner installation with stores in
the LBD. The name(s) and locations (city and state) of all establishments in the LBD are
obtained from the Business Register (BR), which relies on a mix of administrative records
(e.g., tax lings) and Census collections (surveys and censuses). I match the FMI data,
which include store name, city and state, with the LBD/BR. To maximize the match rate,
I spent considerable eort standardizing names of stores and cities and correcting errors in
3I thank Sue Wilkinson from FMI for describing the collection process to me. FMI continued to publish
reports through December 1985, but later reports appear less reliable, with some companies lagging several
months in their reporting. I use the reports through 1985 to identify installations that took place during or
before 1984.
7spelling and geography in both datasets. Despite these eorts, only 3,683, or about 35%,
of new scanner installations through 1984 in the FMI data can be matched with certainty
to stores in the LBD. Figure 3 shows the number of installations per year in the matched
sample. The match rate ranges from 27% (in 1978) to 42% (in 1982).
Non-matching stores fall into three categories. Despite my eorts to standardize city
names (e.g., \Saint" vs. \St."), a small number (a couple of hundred) of stores in the FMI
data cannot be matched because the city in which they are listed does not match any known
city in the LBD. Of the remaining non-matches, approximately half do not match because
the FMI publication lists only the store name, city, and state, and there are multiple possible
matches in the LBD for that store. (Whenever possible, I use the store number to resolve
such matches.) The other half do not match because the LBD does not include a store of that
name in that city, due to a variety of data issues. First, store names vary due to dierences
in spelling, hyphenation, etc. I have made eorts to correct typos and standardize names,
but inevitably, some dierences remain. Mismatches also occur because stores change their
names or are called by dierent names in the two les, for example because the legal name
of the business, which appears in the LBD, diers from the store's name. Second, there
are some mismatches due to having dierent cities listed in the two les, either because the
cities are adjacent and the store is located near the boundary between them, or, in some
cases, because the FMI le lists the nearest large metropolitan area and not the physical
location of the store. Whenever the discrepancy can be resolved unambiguously, I reassign
the city based on the LBD information. Third, some stores with scanner installations are not
coded by Census as food stores (SIC 541) and do not match for this reason. Finally, since
the LBD includes only establishments with paid employees, any non-employers installing
scanners cannot be matched. (This explanation is unlikely to play an important role in the
current application, because most installations appear to be in relatively large stores.)
The LBD has information on establishment payroll and the number of paid employees,
but does not include revenue or other output measures, so studying the productivity eects
8of scanners requires matching to a third data source: the Census of Retail Trade (CRT).
The CRT is part of the Economic Census, which takes place quinquennially in years ending
in \2" and \7." The CRT provides employment as of the week of March 12, annual payroll,
and annual revenue for each retail establishment. The micro les for the CRT are available
electronically starting in 1977, so I am able to match the 1977 and 1982 CRT with the
LBD/FMI data. Although the full 1972 CRT is not available electronically, the 1977 CRT
provides 1972 employment, revenue, and payroll for continuing establishments.
The CRT also asked stores to report the share of their revenue attributed to each of
several grocery categories (meat, sh, and poultry; fresh produce; packaged frozen foods;
dairy products; bakery items; and all other grocery products), as well as alcohol, tobacco
products, health and beauty aids (including prescription and non-prescription drugs), and
other, less common, categories. I have these data only for 1977 and 1982, and from this I
calculate the variable packaged, the share of store i's 1977 revenue obtained from pack-
aged grocery products, which I dene as excluding fresh produce and meats. The variable
packaged is missing if a store did not break down its revenue by category in 1977, if its
1977 reported revenues in the various grocery subcategories sum to within more than 1% of
its total grocery revenue, or if its reported combined revenues from food and all non-food
product lines sum to within more than 1% of its total revenue.
I calculate labor productivity as the ratio of revenue to payroll from CRT data. To reduce
the impact of outliers on coecient estimates, I drop the top and bottom 1% of productivity
values for each year. I focus on labor productivity because the stated goal of most store
managers installing scanners was to reduce labor costs. Labor productivity is preferable to
raw labor costs, however, because raw costs could have increased if sales increased. I prefer
measuring productivity as the ratio of revenue to payroll over the alternative of revenue per
worker for several reasons. First, both revenue and payroll are annual measures, whereas
employment is given at a point in time. Second, revenue and payroll are measured in the
same units, so payroll provides a natural de
ator for revenue. Third, the employment gures
9do not distinguish between full-time and part-time workers, which introduces noise into this
measure and may bias coecient estimates. If stores respond to scanner installations by,
for example, increasing the number of full-time workers relative to part-time workers, we
may see an eect on revenue per worker while revenue per hour is unaected; using revenue
per payroll dollar should eliminate problems of this sort. This is a particular concern since
cashiers tend to work fewer hours than other grocery-store workers, so a reallocation of tasks
across the store is likely to aect the distribution of hours. Finally, employment gures do
not distinguish between high-skilled and low-skilled workers or managers and cashiers, and
stores may change the mix of these as they install scanners, as well. I explore these issues
in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Even the ratio of revenue to payroll is not an ideal measure of productivity. An obvious
problem is that wholesale costs are not netted out of revenue because the Census does not
collect input costs from retailers at the store level.4 Another problem is that revenue is
sensitive to prices. The productivity gains I measure are therefore biased downward if stores
lowered prices, or alternatively if wages increased, in response to scanner-induced increased
worker productivity. In the absence of store-level price de
ators there is no perfect way to
solve this problem, but I am able to get at the magnitude of this problem in a specication
check in which I test for a relationship between scanner installations at other stores in the
city and a store's own productivity.5
A nal problem is that much of the wage variation across establishments is known to
re
ect relative bargaining positions and other factors that do not re
ect either hours of
work or worker skill. For example, Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis, and Troske (2001) nd
substantial variation in wages among full-time workers even after controlling for skill. Using
4These data are collected in an annual survey at the rm level, but only published sector-level averages
are available for this time period.
5All these problems are shared by the employment- (rather than payroll-) based productivity measure used
by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002) and Doms, Jarmin, and Klimek (2004). See Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Krizan (2002), Haskel and Sadun (2009), and Betancourt (2005) for further discussion.
10data from the Current Population Survey's Outgoing Rotation Groups for 1979{1982, I nd
that hours worked and highest grade attained explain 70{75% of usual weekly earnings by
grocery-store employees, depending on the year. Adding occupation (e.g., cashier, manager,
meat cutter, etc.), state, and central-city controls increases the regression R2 to 78{83%.
Standard explanations for dierential returns to skill focus on rm-level variables (typically
unobservable). Since all my regression equations include store xed eects, unobserved store-
or rm-level variables should not bias the results in this paper as long as they do not change
over the time period studied.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for my matched sample. For each year, the table
separates the observations into three adoption cohorts: 1974-1977 (cohort 1a), 1978-1982
(cohort 1b), and 1983-1984 (cohort 2). Since there are only 70 cohort-1a adopters in my
data set, most of the identication comes from cohort-1b adopters. The key identication
assumption in my regressions, therefore, is that the second cohort serves as a valid control
group for the rst cohort. The table compares stores in the rst and second cohorts on ve
dimensions: annual revenue and payroll (de
ated to 1982 real dollars using the all-items
CPI); productivity, which is measured as the ratio of the two; chain size, measured as the
number of stores in the chain; and the fraction of revenue the store obtains from packaged
groceries.
Stores installing scanners got monotonically smaller between cohort 1a and cohort 1b,
and smaller again in cohort 2, in terms of both revenue and payroll. In most years, t-tests
reject the hypothesis that store sizes were the same, on average, for the earliest, middle,
and later adopters. Despite this statistical dierence, the pre-installation distributions are
largely overlapping and similar. Figure 4 compares the distribution of 1972 log revenue for
the three cohorts, and 1977 log revenue for cohorts 1b and 2.
In contrast, chain size, measured as the number of stores operated by the store's owning
rm, grew larger over the adoption cohorts. Chain size is dened to be 1 for the approx-
imately 13% of observations in the sample that were owned by single-establishment rms.
11The share of store revenue coming from packaged goods in 1977 also changed from one cohort
to the next, but not monotonically: it decreased between cohort 1a and cohort 1b adopters
and increased again in cohort 2.
Table 2 reports several city-level variables, also by year and adoption cohort. The
variable CityScanner equals 1 if at least one other grocery store in the city had a scanner
(new or pre-existing) in year t:
CityScannerit 
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> <
> :
0 if maxj2c(i)=i Scannerjt = 0
1 if maxj2c(i)=i Scannerjt > 0
where the set c(i)=i denotes stores in store i's city, c(i), excluding store i. To determine
whether any grocery store in city c had a scanner in year t, I rst remove a small number
of stores from the FMI dataset which are clearly not grocery stores (mainly drugstores and
general-merchandise stores). I include all other stores in the city, whether or not I can
identify them in the LBD.
The table also includes summary statistics on the 1970 population and the number of
food-selling establishments (SIC 541) in 1972 for each city listed in the 1977 County and
City Data Book (CCDB), obtained electronically as ICSPR study 7735, as well as the city's
population growth from 1970 to 1980. After adjusting for spelling variations and typos,
approximately 90% of the establishments in the combined FMI/LBD le merged with the
CCDB data; population gures are available for all matching cities, but only a subset have
establishment counts. City size is not monotonic across cohorts: the very earliest (cohort
1a) installing stores were in larger cities; cohort 1b stores were in slightly smaller cities, and
cohort 2 stores were in larger cities again. Earlier installations also occurred in cities that
grew faster from 1970 to 1980.
124 Scanners and Productivity
4.1 Dierence-in-Dierence Estimates
I estimate productivity regressions using a dierence-in-dierence specication:
ln(productivity)it = i + t + Scannerit + "it (1)
where productivityit is revenue per payroll dollar in store i in year t, i is a store xed
eect, t is a time xed eect, and Scannerit is an indicator for the store having had a
scanner for the full calendar year, or, if the scanner was installed partway through year t,
the fraction of year t during which the store had a scanner. (I assume that a store that
installed a scanner in January had the scanner for 11:5
12 of the year, February installations
were active for 10:5
12 of the year, and so on.) Standard errors "it are clustered at the store
level to allow for arbitrary autocorrelation in the error term.
I limit the analysis to the matched sample to address both measurement error and
omitted-variable bias. Measurement error in the full sample of stores results from the fact
that more than 6,000 stores listed in the FMI data as having installed scanners over the
period of study cannot be matched to stores in the LBD and CRT. Excluding stores in the
Census that did not match with installations in the FMI data ensures that stores coded
as not having scanners as of year t really do not have scanners. Otherwise, measurement
error in the scanner variable would cause attenuation bias of the coecient . Discarding
all unmatched stores eliminates the measurement-error concerns.
Omitted-variable bias is present if the selection into scanning is not random, specically,
if it is either caused directly by store productivity or correlated with other factors that aect
productivity. Because stores that adopted scanners in the early years were on average larger,
more productive, and had higher productivity growth than non-adopting stores, including
non-adopters in the regression would bias the estimate of  upwards. In Appendix A, I
13provide estimates using the full data set and show that the endogeneity bias dominates the
measurement-error bias in the full sample.
Restricting my sample to matched stores imposes only weak conditions for interpreting
the estimates causally. The estimates require only that, conditional on installing a scanner
by December 1984, the exact timing of a store's installation is uncorrelated with the error
term, so that stores that installed in 1983 and 1984 are valid controls for stores that installed
scanners earlier. This is the standard dierence-in-dierence assumption. Endogeneity bias
could still be present if stores that installed scanners in the late 1970s and early 1980s
are systematically dierent from stores that installed scanners in 1983 and 1984, but these
dierences are likely to be much smaller than the dierences between the \treatment" stores
and stores that lacked scanners at the end of 1984. In the next section, I perform two
specication tests to determine the extent to which these problems are in fact addressed
with the limited sample.
My estimate of  is shown in the rst column of Table 3. It shows a 4.5% increase in the
productivity of stores that installed scanners by the end of 1982. Estimates are robust to
several specication tests (not shown), including controlling for state-by-year xed eects,
to allow dierent trends across states, as well as to interacting year xed eects with chain
size, city size (whether measured using the 1970 population of the city or the 1972 number
of food-selling establishments), and city growth rate (measured as the log increase in city
population between 1970 and 1980). The result is also robust to adding rm xed eects
in addition to store xed eects, to account for the small number of stores that change
ownership over the sample period. The estimate continues to be statistically signicant at
the 1% level when clustered at the rm, rather than store, level. Estimates using dierent
samples, e.g., only supermarkets (the primary installers of scanners over this time period),
are also very similar.
In Appendix B, I present alternative estimates using a spline method that exploits
the non-linearities in expected productivity gains between 1977 and 1982 from installing a
14scanner in 1981, 1982, and 1983. This method, which uses signicantly fewer observations
(1,580 in total), generates an estimate of 4.6% productivity gain.
4.2 Specication Tests
In this section, I look for evidence of omitted-variable bias related to other productivity
shocks. For example, productivity-enhancing management or ownership changes, or changes
in store organization, could be concurrent with, or followed closely by, the adoption of
scanning technology. One symptom of this sort of omitted-variable bias could be a positive
\preemptive" estimate of scanner adoption on productivity. Specically, stores that do not
yet have scanners in year t but that install them shortly thereafter (in year t+1) may exhibit
high productivity already in year t. To investigate the extent of this problem, I estimate
ln(productivity)it = i + t + tScannerit + t+1Scanneri;t+1 + "it; (2)
where Scanneri;t+1 is equal to one if store i installed scanners between January and Decem-
ber of year (t+1), and the other variables are as dened earlier. Column (2) of Table 3 shows
estimates of t and t+1. The estimate of t is very similar to the one from Equation (1). The
estimate of t+1 is small and not statistically signicant, consistent with random timing of
installations, or at least with the timing of installations being uncorrelated with other factors
aecting store productivity. In contrast, Appendix Table A-1 shows that if I do not restrict
the sample to stores that installed scanners by 1984, t+1 is estimated to be both large and
statistically signicant. Using the restricted sample appears to solve this omitted-variable
bias.
A second specication test concerns local market conditions. If scanners installations
coincided with, or caused, falling wages or increasing grocery prices, then estimates of the
eect of scanners on productivity would be biased upward. (Conversely, estimates would
be attenuated if installations coincided with increasing wages or decreasing prices.) This
15is a particular concern if faster-rising prices in some cities induced supermarkets in those
cities to install scanners sooner than supermarkets and grocery stores in cities with lower
food-at-home in
ation rates. To test whether this eect is biasing my results, I estimate
ln(productivity)it = i + t + Scannerit + 
CityScannerit + "it: (3)
where CityScannerit equals one if there is at least one other grocery store, besides store i, in
the city with a scanner. Results are shown in the last column of Table 3. Again, the estimate
of  is virtually unchanged, while the estimate of 
 is very small and not statistically dierent
from zero, consistent with an installation process that is neither driven by, nor correlated
with, city-level changes in prices or wages. Restricting the sample to stores without current
scanners to avoid confounding the eects of store- and city-installed scanners, not shown,
produces even smaller estimates of 
. In robustness checks, not shown, I also verify that this
result is not sensitive to city size; in particular, it survives if I restrict the sample to cities
with 1970 population below 100,000 and even below 10,000.
A causal interpretation of the results in Section 4.1 and in the following sections requires
assuming that my sample is free of endogeniety bias, that other drivers of productivity are
uncorrelated with scanner adoption, and that the timing of adoption is independent of their
eect on productivity. While the specication tests in this section are not denitive, their
results are consistent with these assumptions. Of course, it is still possible that stores that
adopt scanners experience a concurrent increase in productivity for any of a host of reasons.
5 Understanding the Productivity Eect
5.1 Decomposition
In this section I separate the impact on store productivity, measured as the revenue-to-payroll
ratio, into its components, estimating separately the eect of scanners on store revenue and
16payroll. I re-estimate Equation (1), replacing the left-hand side variable by ln(revenue)it and
ln(payroll)it, respectively. These results are reported in the rst two columns of Table 4.6
Selmeier (2008, p. 238) reports that a month after installing scanners stores often
experienced a 10-12% increase in revenue, but I nd no evidence of such an eect. The
point estimate of the eect of scanners on revenue is small (and negative), and although the
condence interval is large, a 10% increase in sales can be rejected at the 1% level. The
eect on payroll, however, is negative, statistically signicant, and, at  5:3%, large enough
to fully account for the productivity increase estimated in the previous section.
Since the average annual payroll of stores in the sample is approximately $816,000 (in
1982 dollars), these results imply that, on average, barcode scanners increased productivity
by reducing payroll by about $36,500 per year, and holding revenue unchanged.
For completeness, the rest of the table reports, respectively, the eect on March 12
employment, revenue per March-12 employee, and payroll dollar per March-12 employee.
For these three variables, I also estimate an alternative specication in which I replace the
scanner variable with an indicator which equals 1 if the store installed a scanner no later
than March of year t; results (not shown) are unchanged. The results show that stores
did not adjust their employment in response to the scanner installations. Since revenue was
unchanged, too, productivity gures based on revenue per March-12 employee show no eect.
5.2 Scanners' Skill Bias
The nding that the productivity gain accompanying scanner adoption comes from payroll
reduction begs the question of how this payroll reduction is achieved. The two most obvious
channels, a reduction in worker hours and a reduction of the average hourly pay per worker,
have dierent economic interpretations. In the rst case, the machines are labor-substituting;
in the second, they may increase the relative demand for lower-skilled labor, acting as an
6The number of observations in this table varies with the left-hand side variable because I remove the
top and bottom 1% of each variable separately before estimating the regressions.
17unskilled-biased technology  a la Acemoglu (2002). Supporting the rst alternative, Walsh
(1993) argues that scanners \drastically reduced" the demand for cashiers (p. 106). Sup-
porting the second, Bloom (1972, p. 223) notes that one advantage of the new technology
was that \the automatic feature of the operation would make it possible for stores to hire
less competent applicants."
Since the CRT does not contain information on worker hours, worker wages, or worker
skills, I turn to auxiliary data sources to investigate this issue. The ndings, although
tentative by necessity, suggest a mix of these two channels.
As a rst pass, I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Groups
(ORG) from 1979 to 1989. The CPS ORG includes both an industry code, equivalent to
a 3-digit SIC code, and a detailed occupation code. Over this decade, approximately 6,000
respondents annually reported working at a food store (1970 industry code 628 or 1980
industry code 601, equivalent to SIC 541). Another 2,500 or so per year reported working
for an apparel or shoe store (1970 industry code 657 or 658 or 1980 industry code 630 or
631, equivalent to SIC 56), and 5,000 or so reported working for a general-merchandise store
(1970 industry code 609 or 1980 industry code 591, equivalent to SIC 531 or 532).
I compare the change in compensation for food-store workers with workers in the general-
merchandise and apparel sectors, which were much slower to adopt scanners. From January
1979 to December 1982, the average food-store worker's real hourly wage fell by about 9.3%,
compared with a 7.3% decline in real hourly wages in the apparel and general-merchandise
sectors, consistent with a \de-skilling" eect of scanners. Undermining this explanation, the
percentage of high-school-educated workers increased in all three sectors over this period,
and increased the most among food-store workers.
I repeat these comparisons for the 1983 to 1989 period, during which some general-
merchandise retailers started adopting scanning technology, albeit slowly. In this later period
the real average hourly wage fell most sharply in food stores | by 16%, compared with 4{
6% in the apparel and general-merchandise sectors. The percentage of high-school-educated
18workers also fell in all three sectors, with the largest decline in the food sector. Given the
relatively small sample sizes for these industries in the CPS and the fact that fewer than half
of all food stores | a classication that includes not only supermarkets and specialty food
stores but also convenience stores | and very few general merchandise stores had adopted
scanning by this period, the nding is inconclusive, but is consistent with a de-skilling eect.7
There is also some anecdotal evidence to support this hypothesis. In interviews from the
early adoption period, several store managers and chain executives remarked on the reduction
in on-the-job training costs for new cashiers. A store manager remarked to Progressive Grocer
magazine in 1976 that \today the turnover on the front end is so erce that training the
girls [sic] to tell a Rome from a Delicious apple, or a Texas from a Florida grapefruit, is
time consuming. Worse, it's pretty ineective. On the other hand, they quickly memorize
most of the codes" (Progressive Grocer, March 1976, pp. 40-42). Scanners also reduced
cashiers' need to keep track of which items were eligible for food stamps (Progressive Grocer,
December 1976, p. 70) and which items were to be taxed: \the law [in Pennsylvania]
states that entertainment magazines, like True Confessions, are taxable. But informative
magazines, like Time, are not taxable. So [the cashier does not know] where does People
fall?" (Progressive Grocer, December 1978, p. 56). Consistent with these anecdotes, a
training manual for aspiring cashiers rst published in 1975 and revised for a second edition
in 1984 notes that while cashiers need to know math, this is less true if they work in stores
using \sophisticated register equipment" that can calculate \prices for multiple items and
customer or employee discounts, refunds or returns, taxable merchandise, credit for food
stamps, and so on" (Hephner, 1984, p. 7).
Other evidence on the skill component of the job, however, is more nuanced. The
Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) provides some information,
including a complexity rating, on thousands of job titles, including several entries for cashiers
7The opposite conclusion is reached by Budd and McCall (2001), who study the 1984{86 and 1992{94
periods and nd that scanners may have reined in wage decreases among grocery workers.
19in dierent industries (e.g., banks, retail, hotels, restaurants).8 The occupational description
for retail cashiers changed little between the third edition of the DOT, published in 1965,
and the revised fourth (and last) edition, published in 1991. Each DOT edition rates the
complexity of every job on three dimensions: data, people, and things. Between 1965 and
1977, the rating of cashiers' complexity of working with data and people remained unchanged;
the complexity rating with respect to \things" changed from an \8", denoting \no particular
relationship," to a \2", denoting \operating or controlling a machine." There were no further
changes in the complexity ratings between 1977 and 1991.
The main alternative to savings through lower wages is reduced demand for labor, both
skilled and unskilled. Some functions of low-skilled workers, such as checking, were performed
faster once the store was recongured to make optimal use of the new equipment and the
cashiers were properly trained. This reduced the number of cashiers needed in the store at
any point in time. U.S. Department of Agriculture predictions, reported by Bloom (1972, pp.
218-220), indicated that if 100% of items were to be barcoded, checker speed could increase
by as much as 18{19%; the productivity gain would have been lower in the early years,
but could still have been substantial. Newspaper reports, as well as informal interviews
I conducted with store managers about their personal experiences with scanner adoption,
conrm that stang levels were reduced in scanning stores (see, e.g., Williams, 1984).
An additional benet was achieved in some stores by eliminating item pricing, the pro-
cess of putting individual price stickers on products, replacing it with shelf-pricing. This
practice was not widespread during the period of this study due to both consumer and
union resistance, and in some states due to legal restrictions. Unions and labor groups were
also very much opposed to item-pricing removal, fearing loss of jobs. Dunlop and Rivkin
(1997) report that by March of 1976, three months before scanners were installed, \an under-
standing was reached between the labor and management of the [Joint Labor Management]
8More information on the DOT is available in Lin (2011) and Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).
20Committee [of the Retail Food Industry]: Labor would not block the introduction of scan-
ning systems and would not pursue item pricing legislation, and management would agree to
leave prices on most retail products" (p. 26).9 By 1989, only half of all stores had removed
item prices (Walsh, 1993, p. 102). Stores that did remove item prices were able to reap
signicant labor-cost reductions. In Michigan, which to this day requires prices be noted on
individual packages, the president of one supermarket chain estimated in 1986 that removing
item pricing could have saved him 40{80 worker hours per store per week, or an average of
about $25,000 per store annually (McGrayne, 1986).10
The evidence here, then, suggests that scanners may have contributed to the de-skilling
of the cashier's job, although the full extent of this eect may have been delayed beyond the
initial window on which the current paper focuses. A decrease in demand for workers of all
skill levels, from cashier to meat-cutter to bookkeeper, suggest scanners initially may have
functioned as a form of \undirected" technical change.
5.3 The Value of a Barcode
The benets from scanning depends critically on the number of products labeled with UPCs.
The more manufacturers adopted the UPC, the more retailers beneted from scanners. As
Bloom (1972) notes, \If the operator at the checkout must stop and manually enter the code
for items which are not marked, the benets described could be substantially reduced" (p.
220).
Ideally, I would have liked to directly estimate the increase in productivity from having
one more product bearing a UPC symbol. In the absence of supplier-level information on
UPC adoption I cannot hope to estimate this eect at the store level. Instead, in this
9Walsh (1993) explains this agreement as a strategic decision on the part of organized labor, which did
not want to be seen as anti-innovation and therefore opted to form a coalition with consumers.
10In a previous version of this paper, I attempted to use variation in states' legal environment to estimate
the impact of item-pricing regulation on the magnitude of the productivity eect. The fact that item pricing
remained the rule even when the law allowed stores to remove these prices, however, limited the power of
this exercise.
21section I estimate the eect of carrying more packaged (e.g., boxed, canned, jarred) goods,
since these products generally got UPC codes sooner than frozen and fresh products. I then
use these estimates to back out the impact of one additional barcoded product on a store's
productivity.
To test whether supermarkets whose revenue depended more heavily on products likely
to be barcoded early saw bigger productivity gains from the introduction of scanners, I use
a subset of food stores that provided an accounting of their revenue sources on their 1977
Census form.11 While the sample is relatively small, it allows me to estimate the extent to
which dierences in product emphasis aected stores' ability to exploit the new technology.
I estimate
ln(productivity)it = i + t + 
t  packagedi
+ Scannerit + lScannerit  packagedi + "it (4)
where packaged is the share of store i's 1977 revenue obtained from packaged grocery
products, which I dene as excluding fresh produce and meats. The interaction term

t  packagedi captures the possibly dierent time trends of productivity for stores that
specialize in packaged goods and stores that specialize in other food products, such as fresh
produce.
Results are presented in the rst column of Table 5. While the main eect  is negative,
the coecient l, which captures the additional productivity gain from scanning due to
a higher share of packaged goods, is large, above 0:21, and signicant at the 1% level. To
interpret the results, note that across stores in the sample, the 25th percentile of packaged is
approximately 0.5, and the 75th percentile is 0.7; the mean is 0.6. The point estimates imply
that a store that received half of its revenue from packaged groceries in 1977 experienced a
11I do not have 1972 records on product line sales, so I omit 1972 data from these regressions.
22productivity increase, on average, of only 1.4% when it installed a scanner, compared with a
5.7% productivity increase for a store that got 70% of its revenue from packaged groceries.
When I estimate Equation (4) using revenue and payroll as dependent variables, the
interaction terms are estimated very imprecisely. This is particularly true in the case of
payroll, where the standard error on the interaction coecient is eight times the size of the
coecient.
Making inferences from these estimates to the productivity gain from each additional
UPC requires some additional assumptions. First, I assume for this discussion that packaged
goods are synonymous with barcoded products. In practice, the diusion of UPCs took time,
and not all packaged goods were barcoded during this period. Conversely, some non-packaged
products may have been early adopters of UPC symbols. Second, I use a store's share of
revenue obtained from packaged goods as a proxy for the store's share of items with barcodes
(eectively assuming that the average quantity-weighted price of packaged and non-packaged
goods is the same). Food Marketing Institute reports cited by Messinger and Narasimhan
(1995, Table 6, p. 200) gives the average number of stock-keeping units, or products, in
a supermarket in 1975 as 9,000, a number that increases to 14,000 by 1980. I assume the
average store in my sample had 10,000 products when it introduced a barcode scanner.
With these assumptions, the estimates above can now be translated into the impact of
a single barcode. Adding one barcoded product to a store with 6,000 barcoded products, in
1977, would have increased a store's productivity gain from installing a scanner by 0.0035%.
Given the estimate in Section 5.1 that a 4.5% productivity gain saves the average store
$36,500 in payroll annually, a single additional barcoded product increases the savings due
to a scanner by approximately $28 per year per store.
Since the gain from barcoded products accrued to the retailer, not the manufacturer,
this ballpark gure puts some bounds on the magnitude of network externalities that were
central in the implementation of scanning technology. This gure should be interpreted with
some care, however, since, at best, it represents an average, per product, per store. Both
23the frequency of purchase and the number of scanning stores carrying each product directly
aect the value of an individual barcode.
The second side of this two-side network externality is that the more stores adopt scan-
ners, the greater the demand for UPC-marked products. In principle, this demand shift
could increase the market share of manufacturers that adopted UPCs early at the expense
of later adopters. To the extent that early adopters were likely to larger rms such as the
ones represented on the Ad Hoc Committee | Interstate Brands Corp. (today, Hostess
Brands), H. J. Heinz Company, General Foods Corp. (now Kraft Foods), Bristol-Myers (to-
day, Bristol-Myers Squibb), and General Mills, Inc. | early adoption may have contributed
to increased concentration in the food-manufacturing sector. Anecdotally, gures from the
Census of Manufacturers show that the share of the top four rms in the canned-and-cured
seafood manufacturing industry (SIC 2035), for example, increased from 50% in 1972 to 55%
in 1977 to 62% by 1982; and in the bread, cake, and related products industry (SIC 2051)
it increased from 29% to 33% to 34%. A complete treatment of this topic requires detailed
information on manufacturers' UPC registrations, and is outside the scope of this paper.
6 Cost-Benet Analysis
The cost of scanners varied over time and by manufacturer. Brown (1997, pp. 80-81) gives
a cost of \between $50,000 and $250,000 for a supermarket with $60,000 a week in sales" in
1973. In 1978, a Time magazine article estimated \the purchase price [of] a sophisticated
eight-lane check-out system" at \more than $110,000" (Time Magazine, 1978). Consistent
with this estimate, Shaw (1977, pp. 58-60) quotes prices from IBM for a 10-lane scanning
system at $133,100 in 1976, not including maintenance fees which averaged $7,000/year.
Shaw (1977) also provides other vendors' prices, which were roughly similar. Finally, Bloom
(1972, p. 224), citing an early McKinsey & Co. estimate, predicts that the equipment would
cost \in excess of $150,000" for a store with $4 million in annual revenue, and approximately
24$100,000 for a store with half that revenue. These numbers provide a benchmark against
which to check the credibility of the empirical estimates of scanners' productivity benets.12
Extrapolating to the larger stores that actually installed the early scanners, the cost is likely
to have exceeded $200,000 in 1977 dollars, or about $300,000 in constant 1982 dollars, even
accounting for a 10% decrease in the real price over this time period.
Like other major innovations with network externalities and social returns to scale,
the scanner platform required players in the market to overcome two important barriers:
coordination and short-term costs. (For background, see Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999.)
If the primary barrier were one of coordination costs, we might expect prots to rise quickly
once the platform is adopted. Instead, the above calculation suggests that costs were high
relative to benets in the short run, suggesting that protability constrained the rate of
diusion, with a more limited role for coordination costs, at least once the key design choices
were made.
The opportunity cost of setting up a scanner included more than the cost of hardware and
software. If the installation required the attention of managers be diverted from other tasks,
as implied by many of the early accounts of scanner adoption, the short-term productivity
gains could have been signicantly lower than the above estimates. To quantify this eect I
separately estimate the short-term (current-year) and medium-term productivity impact of
having a scanner installed:
ln(productivity)it = i + t + tScannerit + s1(Scannerit > 0) + "it; (5)
12Very dierent numbers are provided by Zimmerman (1999, p. 39), who quotes a former NCR employee
saying scanners listed for \$4,200 in 1974 and decreased to about $3,800 by 1980." These numbers are
roughly consistent with an early, but undated, document published by scanner system manufacturer National
Semiconductor claiming the cost dierential between a mechanical register and an optical scanner in the
$7,000-$11,000 range (National Semiconductor Corporation Systems Division, undated). I was unable to
determine the source of this discrepancy.
25where 1() is the indicator function. The coecient s represents the non-pecuniary \setup
cost": the one-time contemporaneous eect of a scanner installation on productivity.
Estimates are shown in the second column of Table 5. The productivity gain a store
experiences in the year of scanner adoption is signicantly smaller, both statistically and
economically, than its gain in subsequent years. A scanner installed in January would have
increased the variable Scannerit by 11:5
12 and increased the variable 1(Scannerit > 0) by
one, leading to a net productivity gain of 2.2%. Each year thereafter, the store's productivity
relative to the rest of the industry is 4.6% higher than its baseline.
There are several possible reasons for non-pecuniary setup costs that may be re
ected in
productivity gures. Early accounts of scanner installations, for example by the former IBM
employee Bill Selmeier, are full of details of meetings with store managers. These meetings
could have taken the managers' attention o other issues, such as pricing and scheduling,
reducing observed productivity. Other types of investments, such as reorganization, may have
also interfered with early returns (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003). In addition, scanners' early
productivity gains may have been tempered by additional training and a learning-by-doing
phase. Because relatively few stores installed scanners during a Census year, I was unable to
separately estimate possible \learning-by-doing" eects and the one-time productivity loss
due to installation.
The productivity gains due to scanners probably increased over time for at least three
reasons. First, as discussed earlier, later vintages of scanners, released starting in 1979,
were able to read smaller barcodes and had fewer reading errors. Second, the number
of rms registered with the Uniform Code Council increased monthly, and the number of
manufacturers with UPC registrations more than doubled between 1977 and 1982 (Dunlop
and Rivkin, 1997, Figure 1, p. 4). Finally, manufacturers improved their training of store
managers and cashiers over time. Bill Selmeier recalls the feeling in 1974: \As much as
everyone expected the systems to be productive, somehow they weren't" (Selmeier, 2008, p.
159). IBM was able to provide better training to stores implementing its technology after a
26sending team to investigate the source of the problems.
Since my estimates provide the marginal eect of the average scanner installed over the
period 1974{1982, and installations are heavily weighted towards the later part of this period,
these estimates most likely do not apply to the earliest scanners. To test for a dierential
eect of later scanners, I estimate
ln(productivity)it = i + t + Scannerit + 82Scanneri;82 + "it; (6)
Estimates are shown in the third column of Table 5. The estimate of , which captures the
productivity eect of a scanner installed by December 1977, is negative, but because it is
imprecisely measured, the 1977 eect of a scanner is hard to determine from this regression.
The dierential eect of a scanner installed between 1977 and 1982, 82, is also imprecisely
estimated, but the point estimate is large (5:65%) and dierent from zero at the 5% level.
As already noted, for a store with $816,000 in annual payroll, an average productivity
gain of 4.5% is the equivalent of $36,500 per year in saved payroll. (Figures are all in
1982 dollars.) The shelf-life of a scanner is somewhat hard to gauge from the available data
because upgrades are not always properly classied, but at least 10% of the scanners installed
by the end of 1983 were upgraded by the end of 1984, with the rst upgrades listed as early
as 1978. Given the high cost of scanners and their relatively short life, it seems doubtful
that the early scanners were cost eective despite their large productivity impact (and in
contrast to McKinsey & Co.'s forecasts).
This is not to say that scanners' long-run benets did not outweigh their costs. Cir-
cumstantial evidence links scanners to the explosion in the number of products carried by
supermarkets (Ellickson, 2007, reports that the number of distinct products per supermar-
ket more than doubled between 1980 and 2004). Unfortunately, the data I use in this paper
cannot be used to test this hypothesis, since Census product codes are extremely broad and
only packaged goods were reliably barcoded in the early years of the technology. If scanners
27did lead to increased store size, they may also have contributed to chains' increased market
power in the supermarket industry. Basker, Klimek, and Van (forthcoming) provide evi-
dence that over this period, chains with the biggest increase in the number of products they
carried also opened more stores, suggesting a complementarity between product breadth and
chain size. Larger chains have been able to exploit other sources of competitive advantage,
including economies of scale.
The biggest barrier preventing immediate realization of scanners' benets was the rela-
tively small number of manufacturers printing UPC symbols on their products. This number
increased from about 2,000 at the time of the rst scanner's installation in 1974 to over 8,700
by the 1982 Census and nearly 13,000 by the end of 1984 (Dunlop and Rivkin, 1997). Al-
though no data exists on the number of products bearing UPC symbols, this number probably
increased at a slower rate, since early adopters probably had more distinct products than late
adopters. A second, closely related, barrier was the inability of scanners to \read" barcodes
that were small, wet, wrinkled, or damaged; as noted earlier, these technical barriers were
overcome in stages, in 1979 and 1980. Later still was the problem of coding random-weight
products, such as fresh produce, solved.
A second barrier was popular opposition among consumer and union groups to the
removal of item-level prices, the individual stickers retailers placed on each package with the
item's current price. Although retailers expected to realize signicant saving by replacing
so-called \item pricing" with a single label on the shelf (\shelf pricing"), this potential for
saving was constrained in some states by law and in many others by popular sentiment.13
In addition to the potential for signicant reductions in labor costs, Nakamura (1999) and
others also note that the eventual elimination of item prices increased the ease of price
changes, allowing retailers to experiment and learn about price elasticities.14 Consumer
13Levy, Bergen, Dutta, and Venable (1997) and Bergen, Levy, Ray, Rubin, and Zeliger (2008) make a
compelling case that item pricing was costly to stores and, indirectly, to consumers.
14More generally, the cost of price changes could aect retailers' choice of pricing strategy, e.g., \every-day
28arguments against removing the prices centered on the diculty of checking one's receipt
for errors, the diculty of comparison-shopping, and the belief that supermarkets without
item prices would raise prices more often.15 Unions and labor groups were also very much
opposed to item-pricing removal, fearing loss of jobs. Dunlop and Rivkin (1997) report
that by March of 1976, three months before scanners were installed, \an understanding was
reached between the labor and management of the [Joint Labor Management] Committee
[of the Retail Food Industry]: Labor would not block the introduction of scanning systems
and would not pursue item pricing legislation, and management would agree to leave prices
on most retail products" (p. 26). This barrier eroded over time, but only very slowly. By
1989, only half of all stores had removed item prices (Walsh, 1993, p. 102).
A nal and important barrier to full utilization of the new technology was removed with
the development and adoption of complementary technologies. The use of scanner-collected
information on sales for inventory-management purposes, which provided a major benet
to both retailers and manufacturers, was neither immediate nor obvious to early adopters.
According to Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond, and Weil (1999), for example, inventory con-
trol was not among the initial benets anticipated by scanner adopters. Scanner-enabled
inventory keeping, in turn, allowed the development of electronic data interchange (EDI),
including automated purchasing and payments, which helped retailers realize large cost sav-
ings (Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond, and Weil, 1999). Only once retailers fully integrated
these technologies into their operations could they realize the full productivity benets of
scanners.
low pricing" (ELDP) vs. \promotional" (\Hi-Lo") pricing. See Ellickson and Misra (2008) for a discussion
of pricing strategies.
15This concern may not have been unrealistic considering the high in
ation rate during scanning's rst
years.
297 Concluding Remarks
Much of the conversation about the so-called \ICT revolution" has focused on the 1990s and
2000s, often with only murky measures of \technology." This paper goes back in time to
trace the eect of an early innovation | the introduction of barcode scanners by grocery
stores in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Using a specic well-dened measure of technological
innovation, and detailed store-level data on productivity, I nd evidence of a direct causal
relationship between technology adoption and productivity. To my knowledge, this is the
rst systematic evidence on the impact of any specic innovation on worker productivity in
the retail industry.
I nd that the early scanners increased store-level productivity by 4.5% on average,
though the very earliest scanners probably had a much smaller impact, and setup costs
substantially reduced rst-year returns. The returns were higher at larger chains, which
had been represented in the standard-setting initiative from the beginning and had been the
strongest advocates of scanning. Each additional barcoded product contributed, on average,
$28 to the cost saving. Despite these impressive productivity gains, scanners were probably
not a cost-eective investment in the early years.
The new platform required distributed investment, unequal economic burden, and uncer-
tain protability. It is a remarkable feat that chain retailers, stand-alone stores, wholesalers,
food manufacturers, and scanner manufacturers were able to accomplish this transformation
absent any government intervention and without massive transfers or cross-subsidies across
players. Nevertheless, my calculations suggest that limited short-run protability, more than
the heterogeneity of costs and benets and associated coordination costs, played a key role
in limiting the adoption of this technology. Part of the explanation for the relative ease of
coordination may be the relative ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the original Ad Hoc
Committee. Another was, perhaps, a sense of urgency. If the industry failed to adopt a
uniform code, individual supermarket chains were said to be likely to adopt dierent codes,
the cost of which was likely to have been far higher. These higher costs would have been
30incurred not only by supermarkets, in terms of higher production costs of scanners and du-
plication of research and development, but also by manufacturers, which would have had to
contend with placing many competing symbols on their packages.
Were scanners an example of capital deepening, or did they represent a profound shift in
the way capital and labor are used | in other words, a change in total-factor productivity?
Census data on the retail sector are too coarse to answer this question directly, but the
path of progress after scanners' initial deployment suggests they represented more than
capital deepening. Most store-level technological innovations since the 1970s have built
upon the early scanners. Software and hardware upgrades now enable retailers to keep track
of inventories and engage in electronic procurement and payments, reducing back-oce labor
costs. Inventory management may be further enhanced by the widespread implementation
of radio-frequency identication (RFID), which will enable employees to \scan" items not
in their direct line of vision. At the front end, the recent introduction of self-checkout
| impossible before scanning | also appears to be reducing labor costs with hardly any
additional capital investment.
31A Measurement Error and Selection Bias
I restrict the sample used in this paper to stores that installed scanners by the end of
1984, and which I was able to match with observations in the LBD, in order to address
both omitted-variable and measurement-error biases. In this Appendix, I re-estimate Equa-
tions (1)-(3) using the full set of stores classied in SIC 541 to investigate the extent of
selection bias and measurement error in the full sample of stores. The results are shown in
Table A-1.
The omitted-variable concern is that stores adopted barcodes because of some unob-
served factor, which either has itself a direct eect on store productivity, or is correlated
with other unobserved factors aecting store productivity. Including store xed eects in
the regression controls for any time-invariant store-level dierences in both observed and
unobserved factors, but cannot account for time-varying eects. For example, stores that
implement scanning may have grown, on average, relative to other grocery stores in this
time period, or may have been located in neighborhoods that become relatively more pros-
perous. If these unobserved characteristics create dierential productivity trends in stores
that ultimately adopt scanners and stores that do not, a na ve regression would attribute
the dierential trend to the impact of scanners. In the main text, I argue that this problem
is eliminated when I restrict the sample to stores that adopted scanners by December 1984.
The specication tests support this argument. While omitted-variable bias could be either
positive or negative, in this case it is almost certain to overstate the eect of a scanner.
The measurement-error concern is not present in the restricted sample by construction,
since every store included in the sample is known to have installed a scanner. But because
I am unable to match more than 6,000 stores listed in the FMI publication to stores in the
Census, it is very likely that the full sample of stores includes some for which my scanner
variable is set to zero actually had scanners for part of the sample period. This measurement
error creates attenuation bias in the estimated coecients.
In the full sample, the estimate of  from Equation (1), shown in the rst column,
32is nearly 0:15, or three times the magnitude of the estimate in the restricted sample, in-
dicating large omitted-variable bias. Consistent with this conclusion, the estimate of t+1
from Equation (2) is also positive, large, and signicant. The statistical signicance is not
merely an artifact of the large sample. Scanner installation in year t + 1 is associated with
a 10% increase in store productivity in year t, an increase that amounts to two thirds of the
estimated post-installation productivity increase. The positive and statistically signicant
estimate of 
 from Equation (3) in the full sample, shown in column (3), most likely re
ects
measurement error.
B Spline Estimation
As a complement to the dierence-in-dierence estimates presented in the main part this
paper, I also present a piecewise linear regression that exploits the timing of installations.
Since most scanners were installed in the second part of my sample, I focus for this section
on the years 1981{1983.
This analysis exploits the nonlinearity in the relationship between the timing of instal-
lation and the estimated impact on the store's measured productivity in 1982. Specically,
while the impact of scanners installed in 1981 should be fully captured in 1982 productivity,
the impact of scanners installed in 1982 should be partially captured in 1982 productivity
| more so, the earlier in the year the installation occurred | and the impact of scanners
installed in 1983 should have had no eect on 1982 productivity. To test this hypothesis I
estimate a spline regression. The left-hand side variable is a store's productivity growth from
1977 to 1982. I limit the sample to the 1,580 stores that installed scanners from January 1981
to December 1983 and for which I have both 1977 and 1982 productivity measures. This
limited sample imposes even weaker identifying assumptions than the \installer" scanner
used in the main part of the paper, namely that, conditional on a store installing a scanner
over this 3-year period, the timing of installation is uncorrelated with other factors related
33to the store's productivity growth from 1977 to 1982.
For each store, I dene ScanTime to be the time elapsed, in months, between January
1, 1982 and the store's installation date. For example, if a store installed a scanner in March
1982, this variable equals 2:5; if the store installed a scanner in November 1981, this variable
equals  1:5. Since my sample is limited to stores that installed scanners from January
1981 to December 1983, ScanTime takes on values from  11:5 to 23:5. To accommodate
the nonlinearity discussed above, I create two knots in ScanTime, allowing changes in the
constant term starting at ScanTime = 0, separating stores that installed in 1981 from stores
that installed in 1982, and at ScanTime = 12, separating stores that installed in 1982 from
stores that installed in 1983. I then estimate the piecewise linear relationship between the
timing of scanner installation and productivity growth using a spline regression:
ln(productivity)i;1982 = 0 + 0ScanTimei  1(ScanTimei < 0)
+ 11(ScanTimei 2 [0;12)) + 1ScanTimei  1(ScanTimei 2 [0;12))
+ 21(ScanTimei  12) + 2ScanTimei  1(ScanTimei  12) + "i; (B-1)
where, as before,1() is the indicator function, and ln(productivity)i;1982 is the dierence
between establishment i's 1982 productivity and its 1977 productivity.
The results are shown graphically as the dashed (green) line in Figure B-1. I have
normalized the coecients so that the point estimate for the eect of a scanner installed
at ScanTime = 12 (January 1, 1983) is zero. Dashed vertical lines indicate the knots.
The results show a downward-sloping relationship between 1982 productivity gains and the
time of installation for the full period from January 1981 to December 1982, followed by
a slight upward-sloping relationship. Only the coecient on the middle segment of the
spline, however, statistically signicant at the 10% level. That coecient indicates that each
additional month without a scanner reduces a store's productivity in 1982, relative to its
341977 level, by 0.29%, or 3.5% annualized.16
To increase the power and precision of these estimates, I also estimate an alternative
specication in which I force the slopes of the rst and last segments to be zero, and omit
the level shifters between segments. The estimated coecients from this regression are
shown as the solid (orange) line in Figure B-1. Each month without a scanner reduces the
store's 1982 productivity by 0.38%. Put dierently, scanning for the full year increases the
store's productivity growth by 4.6%, a gure remarkably close to the dierence-in-dierence
estimate presented in Table 3.
C Heterogeneous Eects of Scanners
I extend the basic analysis of Section 4.1 by allowing the eect of a barcode scanner on a
store's productivity to vary with the characteristics of the rm to which the store belongs
or the city in which it is located. There are many dimensions on which scanner adoption
could have dierential eects, and a complete catalog of these is beyond the scope of this
paper. I focus on one rm-level covariate, the size of the chain, and three city-level covariates:
population in 1970, number of food-selling establishments in 1972, and the population growth
rate between 1970 and 1980. Summary statistics for these variables are provided in Tables 1
and 2 in the paper.
I estimate
ln(productivity)it = i + t + 
t  ln(Xi)
+ Scannerit + xScannerit  ln(Xi) + "it (C-1)
16In unreported regressions, I also estimate variants of this regression in which I replace the left-hand side
variable with the store's 1982 productivity (instead of productivity growth), both with or without controlling
for 1977 productivity. Those results show larger eects, annualized to productivity gains of 7.6% and 5.2%,
respectively. In model variants that allow discontinuities at the knots, the discontinuities are never jointly
signicant.
35where X is, respectively, the rm's size (measured as the number of stores it operates), the
city's population in 1970, the number of food-selling establishments (SIC 541) in 1972 in the
city, or the city's population growth. Not all cities in the LBD/FMI dataset have city-level
variables, so these regressions are estimated with the subset of observations for which I have
city-level data.
The results are shown in Table C-1. None of the interaction eects are statistically signif-
icant at the 5 percent level; the population interaction is signicant at the 10 percent level.
The interaction terms are also not statistically signicant when I estimate heterogeneous
eects on stores' payroll or revenue.
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40Figure 1. U.S. Scanning Stores, 1974{1984
Shaded periods represent Census years
Source: Author's calculations from Food Marketing Institute data
41(a) 1977
(b) 1982
Figure 2. Scanner Locations, Year End 1977 and 1982
Alaska and Hawaii installations not shown
Source: Author's calculations from Food Marketing Institute data
42Figure 3. Number of Scanner Installations Matched to Business Register, by Year
Figure 4. Log Annual Revenue by Cohort, 1972 and 1977
43Figure B-1. Spline Estimates of Scanners' Eect on Labor Productivity
44T
a
b
l
e
1
.
E
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
S
t
o
r
e
s
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
P
a
y
r
o
l
l
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
a
C
h
a
i
n
S
i
z
e
P
a
c
k
a
g
e
d
b
1
9
7
2
:
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
a
4
1
9
,
2
1
7
8
7
3
1
0
.
5
1
4
8
0
.
6
3
1
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
b
9
0
2
8
,
2
0
7
7
2
1
1
2
.
1
2
4
5
0
.
5
8
9
t
-
t
e
s
t
c
0
.
2
0
6
0
.
0
4
3
0
.
0
0
5
0
.
1
2
7
0
.
0
4
9
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
9
4
3
8
,
2
5
0
7
2
7
1
2
.
0
2
4
0
0
.
5
9
1
C
o
h
o
r
t
2
7
5
5
7
,
6
9
6
6
9
0
1
2
.
0
5
4
5
0
.
6
0
5
t
-
t
e
s
t
d
0
.
0
2
9
0
.
1
0
8
0
.
9
8
2
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
1
9
1
9
7
7
:
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
a
7
0
1
1
,
5
2
6
1
,
1
2
1
1
1
.
3
1
4
2
0
.
6
3
2
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
b
1
,
4
6
9
9
,
4
2
3
8
7
4
1
1
.
4
2
8
2
0
.
5
8
5
t
-
t
e
s
t
c
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
8
0
5
0
.
0
0
9
0
.
0
0
2
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
1
,
5
3
9
9
,
5
1
9
8
8
6
1
1
.
4
2
7
5
0
.
5
8
7
C
o
h
o
r
t
2
1
,
1
5
6
8
,
3
7
3
7
7
9
1
1
.
5
5
5
7
0
.
6
0
4
t
-
t
e
s
t
d
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
6
1
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
1
9
8
2
:
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
a
6
3
1
1
,
6
7
6
1
,
1
0
9
1
1
.
3
1
2
1
0
.
6
3
2
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
b
2
,
0
5
3
8
,
9
1
7
8
6
7
1
1
.
1
3
0
3
0
.
5
8
5
t
-
t
e
s
t
c
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
6
4
0
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
3
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
2
,
1
1
6
8
,
9
9
9
8
7
4
1
1
.
1
2
9
8
0
.
5
8
7
C
o
h
o
r
t
2
1
,
3
5
6
8
,
2
0
5
8
1
0
1
0
.
7
5
8
1
0
.
6
0
6
t
-
t
e
s
t
d
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
7
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
N
o
t
e
:
C
o
h
o
r
t
1
a
s
t
o
r
e
s
i
n
s
t
a
l
l
e
d
s
c
a
n
n
e
r
s
b
y
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
7
7
;
c
o
h
o
r
t
1
b
i
n
s
t
a
l
l
e
d
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
7
8
t
o
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
2
;
c
o
h
o
r
t
1
c
o
m
b
i
n
e
s
1
a
a
n
d
1
b
;
c
o
h
o
r
t
2
i
n
s
t
a
l
l
e
d
s
c
a
n
n
e
r
s
i
n
1
9
8
3
a
n
d
1
9
8
4
.
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
a
n
d
p
a
y
r
o
l
l
a
r
e
i
n
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
o
f
1
9
8
2
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
;
c
h
a
i
n
s
i
z
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
s
t
o
r
e
s
a
R
a
t
i
o
o
f
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
t
o
p
a
y
r
o
l
l
;
s
e
e
t
e
x
t
f
o
r
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
b
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
1
9
7
7
s
t
o
r
e
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
a
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d
t
o
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
d
g
r
o
c
e
r
i
e
s
c
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
f
r
o
m
t
-
t
e
s
t
f
o
r
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
o
f
m
e
a
n
s
f
o
r
c
o
h
o
r
t
s
1
a
a
n
d
1
b
d
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
f
r
o
m
t
-
t
e
s
t
f
o
r
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
o
f
m
e
a
n
s
f
o
r
c
o
h
o
r
t
s
1
a
n
d
2
45Table 2. City-Level Summary Statistics
1970 1972 Food 1970{1980
CityScannera Populationb Estabsb Pop Growth
1972: Cohort 1a 0.000 153,321 151 0.241
Cohort 1b 0.000 114,155 120 0.124
t-teste 0.497 0.608 0.027
Cohort 1 0.000 115,807 122 0.129
Cohort 2 0.000 207,279 217 0.118
t-testf 0.000 0.000 0.471
1977: Cohort 1a 0.157 225,319 241 0.188
Cohort 1b 0.100 111,574 118 0.173
t-teste 0.124 0.010 0.010 0.761
Cohort 1 0.103 116,617 123 0.174
Cohort 2 0.164 175,425 187 0.140
t-testf 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1982: Cohort 1a 0.698 234,441 252 0.195
Cohort 1b 0.652 113,037 123 0.200
t-teste 0.443 0.006 0.008 0.929
Cohort 1 0.653 116,581 126 0.200
Cohort 2 0.633 184,209 199 0.151
t-testf 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.001
See notes to Table 1. Observation counts for CityScanner are as in Table 1.
Observation counts for other variables are lower due to incomplete city-level data.
a Indicator for city having at least one (other) scanning store, calculated by author
b Source: City and County Data Book (CCDB) from ICSPR study 7735
Table 3. Scanners' Eect on Labor Productivity: Dierence-in-Dierence Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Scanner 0.0451*** 0.0495*** 0.0454***
(0.0084) (0.0105) (0.0084)
Scannert+1 0.0076
(0.0099)
CityScanner  0.0068
(0.0073)
Year FE X X X
Store FE X X X
Observations 7,865 7,865 7,865
LHS variable is log productivity. Unbalanced panels, 1972{1982.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by store)
*** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%
46Table 4. Scanners' Eect on Alternative Outcomes: Dierence-in-Dierence Estimates
Revenue Payroll
Annual Annual March 12 per March per March
Revenue Payroll Employment Employee Employee
Scanner  0.0097  0.0535** 0.0299 0.0022  0.0546***
(0.0253) (0.0259) (0.0256) (0.0173) (0.0210)
Year FE X X X X X
Store FE X X X X X
Observations 7,050 7,050 6,960 7,552 6,556
LHS variables in column headers (in logs). Unbalanced panels, 1972{1982.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by store)
*** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%
Table 5. Scanners' Eect on Labor Productivity: Interactions
(1) (2) (3)
Scanner  0.0914** 0.0460***  0.0072
(0.0436) (0.0085) (0.0241)
Scanner 0.2115***
packaged
a (0.0718)
1(Scannert > 0)  0.0234***
(0.0091)
Scanner1982 0.0546**
(0.0242)
Year FE X X X
Year FE  packaged X
Store FE X X X
Years 1977{1982 1972{1982 1972{1982
Observations 4,913 7,863 7,863
LHS variable is log productivity. Unbalanced panels.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by store)
*** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%
a 1977 revenue share from packaged goods
47Table A-1. Scanners' Eect on Labor Productivity: All Grocery Stores
(1) (2) (3)
Scanner 0.1484*** 0.1540*** 0.1428***
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0068)
Scannert+1 0.1000***
(0.0074)
CityScanner 0.0330***
(0.0038)
Year FE X X X
Store FE X X X
Observations 247,242 247,242 247,242
LHS variable is log productivity. Unbalanced panels, 1972{1982.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by store)
*** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%
Table C-1. Heterogeneous Eects of Scanners on Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Scanner 0.0511*** 0.1443** 0.0773* 0.0434***
(0.0184) (0.0563) (0.0441) (0.0099)
Scanner  0.0032
ln(ChainSize)a (0.0037)
Scanner  0.0096*
ln(Pop1970)b (0.0054)
Scanner  0.0085
ln(Estab1972)c (0.0092)
Scanner 0.0125
ln(Growth)d (0.0310)
Year FE X X X X
Year FE ln(ChainSize) X
Year FE ln(Pop1970) X
Year FE ln(Estab1972) X
Year FE ln(Growth) X
Store FE X X X X
Observations 7,865 7,057 3,546 7,057
LHS variable is log productivity. Unbalanced panels, 1972{1982.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by store)
*** signicant at 1%; ** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%
a Number of stores in the chain in 1977
b 1970 city population from City and County Data Book
c 1972 number of food-selling establishments from City and County Data Book
d Log 1970 to 1980 population growth
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